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Abstract 
 
This paper uses data drawn from the English Football League to model separate hazard 
rates for club managers for the 2001/2, 2002/3 and 2003/4 seasons.  On average over the 
three seasons, approximately one-third of managers involuntarily exited employment 
status with their club.  We model the hazard using a standard logistic model exploiting 
information on the spell at risk rather than the individual. The role of neglected 
heterogeneity is also examined using random and fixed effects logistic models within a 
discrete-time setting.  League position at the start of the spell at risk is found to be the 
most important determinant of a manager’s involuntary exit.  A variety of individual 
specific human capital and other covariates are found to be unimportant in determining 
the hazard and no role for unobservable heterogeneity as captured by random effects is 
detected.  
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 1
Introduction 
 
The high turnover rate among managers in the English Football League is well 
documented in Audas, Dobson and Goddard (1999).  Scully (1994) used a long time 
series of United States data to examine the relationship between managerial efficiency 
and managerial survival rates in basketball, (American) football and baseball. In spite of 
this, there has been a modest literature that attempts to explain the employment survival 
of football managers.  Audas, Dobson and Goddard (op.cit.) and Hope (2003) provide 
rare examples. The former authors use continuous time duration modelling and exploit 
match-level data over a 25-year period to explain involuntary separations of football 
managers.  On the other hand, Hope (2003) uses Operations Research techniques to 
determine the optimal time to sack a manager. The purpose of this paper is to add to this 
modest literature through an examination of managerial exit patterns in three recent 
league seasons.  This allows us to examine whether the effects of important covariates are 
relatively stable over a short time period.  Our empirical approach emphasizes the role of 
intra-season performance indicators as determinants of involuntary exit.   
 
In contrast to the existing empirical work on this issue, we exploit a discrete-time 
approach in the hazard modelling.  The calendar month within the season provides the 
measure for the spell at risk. This facilitates use of a standard logistic model and allows 
an easier introduction of time-varying covariates.  In addition, we endeavour to capture 
neglected heterogeneity through exploiting the panel nature of the spell at risk data. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section contains a description of the 
empirical methodology used and is followed by a section describing the data. The 
penultimate section discusses the empirical results and a final section offers some 
conclusions. 
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Methodology 
 
Hazard modelling has traditionally been undertaken within a continuous-time framework 
(see Lancaster (1992)).  More recently, however, situating the analysis within a discrete-
time context has become popular as it allows for a degree of simplification in the 
modelling.   Jenkins (1995), exploiting the work of Allison (1982), suggests a useful way 
for the estimation of discrete-time hazard models using a binary logistic regression 
model.  The approach requires re-organization of the data away from the individual as the 
unit of observation to the spell at risk of event occurrence. The individual-level data are 
thus replaced by spell at risk data stacked by individual.  Each individual unit contributes 
multiple observations to an expanded likelihood function. In the first period an individual 
unit either stays or exits the state occupied.  Those that survive into the second period 
either remain or exit in that period and so forth into subsequent periods with the numbers 
surviving, and hence contributing to the likelihood function, diminishing as individuals 
leave the state in question.  The dependent variable in this type of setting could be 
denoted yi,t and defined as 1 if the ith individual exits the state at time period t, and zero 
otherwise.            
 
 
The re-organization of the data allows construction of an unbalanced panel dataset where 
a maximum of N individuals are observed over T discrete time periods.  This could be 
developed a little further by introducing covariates and separate intercepts for each failure 
period to capture the baseline hazard.  The logistic is a computationally straight-forward 
transformation and possesses an added advantage of providing a non-proportional hazard.  
This may be formulated as follows: 
 
prob(yi,t =1) = 
 ]  exp[1
 ]  exp[
ti,
'
ti,
'
ti,
'
ti,
'
Dδxβ
Dδxβ

       [1] 
 
The dependent variable represents the probability of individual i exiting in a small 
interval after period t conditional on having survived to period t, where xi,t is a vector of 
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covariates, which may or may not vary over time. The vector Di,t denotes the baseline 
hazard, which can be specified by a set of dummy variables for each failure time period 
(see Sueyoshi (1995)). This provides another advantage in that the estimates for the 
baseline hazard are derived directly as part of the estimation procedure. This approach 
has the merit of simplicity and also allows an easier introduction of time-varying 
covariates than parametric continuous-time hazard models.  This latter advantage has 
some relevance in the current application given the potential for a strong correlation 
between the hazard of interest and time-varying performance indicators.       
 
The discrete approach, though computationally straightforward, is not free of criticism.  
The first relates to the inflation of the sample size through the re-organization of the data.  
Though a legitimate concern, the estimates obtained are still maximum likelihood and 
retain the asymptotic properties of this class of estimator.  The second relates to the 
treatment of the repeated observations as if they were independent of each other.  This is 
clearly not the case given the data re-organization with correlation across observations 
allowing the potential for some degree of inefficiency in the estimates and a downward 
bias in the sampling variance. However, as Robinson (1982) demonstrates with a probit 
model, ignoring the correlation across time does not affect the consistency of the 
maximum likelihood estimates. Following Allison (1982), we exploit an approach within 
the discrete-time framework that provides a solution to this particular problem (see 
below). 
 
Neglected heterogeneity, a potentially important issue in hazard modelling, could also be 
addressed by exploiting the panel nature of the data.  In particular, the binary logistic 
model could be re-specified to allow for individual-specific fixed effects as follows:  
 
prob(yi,t =1) = 
 ]α  exp[1
 ]α  exp[
iti,
'
iti,
'


xβ
xβ       [2] 
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The construction of the relevant likelihood for this logistic model and its maximization 
with respect to the β vector and αi terms yields consistent estimators only if the number of 
time periods goes to infinity.  In empirical applications this is impractical and, with a 
fixed T, estimates of the fixed effects and the parameter vector are inconsistent. The 
Monte Carlo experiments reported by Katz (2001) suggest that the scale of the bias may 
attenuate with T > 15. The inconsistency arises because the number of incidental 
parameters increases without bound as N → ∞.  Chamberlain (1980) suggests 
maximizing a log-likelihood function conditional on a set of minimal sufficient statistics 
that help sweep out the fixed effects. A sufficient statistic in the case of the incidental 
parameters for the logit is
1t
ti,y . The model parameters are only identified through the 
‘within’ dimension of the data.   
 
As in the case of the fixed effects linear regression model, only time-varying covariates 
are permissible with this procedure. The groups of data points used to construct the 
estimator for β are confined to those that exhibit a change in status.  The groups that 
exhibit no change in status are discarded as they provide no information about the vector 
β.  The use of this procedure requires belief that all the information required for β is 
contained in the non-discarded data. This is a fairly stringent requirement and may not be 
appropriate for all applications. A further limitation with this approach is that the fixed 
effects cannot be retrieved for further interrogation or analysis. A crude way of 
overcoming this problem would be to estimate a Linear Probability Model (LPM) with 
fixed effects. However, this procedure is inherently heteroscedastic and will have a strong 
tendency to predict outside the lower end of the [0,1] boundary given the low hazard rates 
generally encountered in these applications.  This particular approach is thus not pursued 
here.  
   
The neglected heterogeneity could alternatively be captured through treating the omitted 
factors as random.  This sits more comfortably within the hazard modelling tradition than 
the fixed effects approach.   The random effects specification is expressed as:     
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prob(yi,t =1)= 
 ]u  exp[1
 ]u  exp[
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'
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'


xβ
xβ       [3] 
 
with ui ~ N(0, 2u ), where2u  = 
 and ρ captures the correlation in unobservables 
across the time units (see Greene Ch.19.5 for further details).   The ui random term varies 
across the individuals and is assumed to follow a normal distribution. This could be 
viewed as more plausible than the Gamma distribution traditionally assumed for such 
heterogeneity in the early duration literature (for example, see Lancaster (1979)).  The 
random effects logistic model can be estimated by maximum likelihood techniques.  The 
additional merit of this model is that it provides a basis for testing the proposition of no 
cross-period correlations (i.e., ρ=0) and, implicitly, whether 2u  is zero.  It thus provides a 
formal test for the presence of random effects. If ρ=0 then the resultant estimates are 
comparable to those from a pooled (or stacked) logistic model.  The estimation for this 
paper was conducted using the STATA (version 8) software package. 
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Data 
 
The empirical analysis uses data collected from the 33rd edition of the Rothmans Football 
Yearbook and various editions of the Sky Sports Football Yearbooks.  We focus on three 
seasons: 2001/2, 2002/3 and 2003/4.  The managerial exits examined in each season 
comprise only involuntary separations.  The voluntary separations are excluded from our 
analysis given that the process determining this type of separation is likely to be distinct 
from that governing the involuntary type.  Once voluntary separations are excluded, the 
number of managers available at the start of each of the three seasons is 89, 91, and 87 
for the 2001/2, 2002/3 and 2003/4 respectively.  The discrete approach we adopt uses the 
month as the measure for the spell at risk and there are nine of these in the football 
season.  The choice of time interval is arbitrary but anything shorter did not prove 
sensible for the construction of the time-varying performance covariates of most interest 
to us.  The analysis is restricted to modelling the single risk of whether the individual 
involuntarily exits the state or not.    
 
We model time to failure starting in early August and concluding in late April given our 
interest in intra-season separations. This implies that if a manager has survived to the end 
of April we ignore whether he gets sacked in May or later in the summer close season.  
We take the view that involuntary separations in May (or later) might be taken to reflect 
factors other than those related to within season performance.    Thus, we start with the 
maximum number of managers that were not subject to voluntary departure from their 
club (N) and for those that survive to the end of April, we have a maximum of T=9 
person-specific observations for each individual.  The stacked (or panel) data inflate to 
626, 736 and 646 spell at risk observations in the 2001/2, 2002/3 and 2003/4 seasons 
respectively reflecting the loss of individuals due to exits.   
 
The Kaplan-Meier hazard rates for each of the nine months in each of the three seasons 
are contained in table 1 with asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses where 
relevant.  The raw data suggest the peak exit month was October in the first two seasons, 
though the pattern appears more even across months in the final season.  There were no 
exits in the months of August, December or February in the 2002/3 season and this 
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curtails how we choose to specify the baseline hazard in the pooled (or stacked) logit 
model  in the three seasons (see below). 
 
The use of the discrete-time approach outlined earlier allows for a very simple 
introduction of time-varying monthly covariates in our analysis.  A variety of different 
measures were initially explored to determine their use as covariates in the hazard 
function. These included an extensive set of time-varying performance measures and 
time-invariant personal and club-level characteristics (see below).  However, only a small 
sub-set of these exerted any independent influence on the hazard and for brevity, the 
reported analysis is restricted to those that recorded some effect in one or other of the 
models estimated.  These comprise two time-varying covariates and one time-invariant 
covariate described in table 2.  The role of other covariates is discussed later.  
 
The position (15th or lower) used to determine whether a team is in the relegation zone or 
not is broader than conventionally understood.  Although this cut-off point is arbitrary it 
is felt that it adequately captures league under-performance.  It is anticipated that this 
covariate will exert a positive effect on the hazard.  In work not reported here we also 
used separately continuous measures relating to actual league position of the club at the 
start of the risk month and the number of wins in the previous month.  The estimated 
effects for both were as anticipated and registered well determined effects in all cases but 
offered little enhancement to the regression models in terms of an improvement in the 
maximised log-likelihood values.  Thus, for the analysis undertaken here, we report 
estimates based on the binary measure capturing whether the club is in the relegation 
zone or not at the start of the risk month.            
 
The attendance measure used is defined as attendance expressed as a percentage of a 
club’s ground capacity averaged over the home league games in the month prior to the 
risk month.  We believe that this percentage rate measure is more meaningful in this 
particular context given the wide variation in absolute attendance figures across all four 
leagues.  It is arguable that what is important to a league club is not absolute attendance 
but the distance it reflects from capacity. This measure could be taken to provide a 
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barometer of fan support for the manager. More importantly, however, the attendance rate 
provides the club board the financial incentive to either retain or dispense with the 
services of the current incumbent.  Given this interpretation, we anticipate that the greater 
the attendance rate, the lower the hazard is likely to be.   
 
As noted above, these two measures are based on realizations at the start of the risk 
month. In the case of the August spell at risk the realisations for the two time-varying 
covariates relate to the league position at the end of the last season and the attendance 
figure is averaged over the month of April from the previous season.   Finally, one time-
invariant characteristic found to contain some explanatory power in a number of the 
estimated logistic regression models is a binary measure that captures whether a manager 
was capped at senior international level during his professional playing career or not.      
 
Our empirical approach also allows for the introduction of factors that capture 
unobservables.  These unobservable effects could be taken to reflect individual 
heterogeneity that capture coaching ability, man-management skills or other motivational 
attributes that are assumed to vary across individuals.  These omitted factors might also 
be club-specific in nature and reflect the attitude, patience, indulgence or otherwise of 
those that have the responsibility for running the football club.  The omitted factors are 
separately treated as either fixed (see [2] above) or random (see [3] above) in the 
estimated specifications.  The importance of these latter factors is tested empirically.     
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Empirical Results 
 
The absence of exits in three of the nine months for the middle season (see table 1) 
implies that a flexible baseline hazard based on intercepts for individual months does not 
provide a complete replacement for the constant term in the empirical specification. 
Therefore, the baseline hazard used in this study conflates the months into pairs for the 
first six months and allows a final intercept to capture the February to April risk period.  
This treatment allows for a reasonably flexible baseline hazard that fully replaces the 
constant term.    
 
The maximum likelihood estimates for the hazard rate models for the three separate 
league seasons are reported in tables 3 to 5.  The first column of each table reports 
estimates using the above-defined baseline hazard specification but excluding any 
covariates.  The estimates give the effect on the log odds ratio of exit. Once transformed 
into probability effects these provide Kaplan-Meier estimates but, given the conflation 
discussed above, are not directly comparable to those reported in table 1. The relevant 
transformation is [1 + exp[-δk]]-1 where δk  is the logistic parameter corresponding to the 
kth period at risk.  The highest risk period is October/November in the first two seasons 
though the February to April period has a slight edge over October/November in the final 
season reviewed here.  A possible conjecture for this result in regard to the two earlier 
seasons is that, from a club management board perspective, this period is far enough into 
the season to assess managerial competence but sufficiently early to replace an under-
performing manager and salvage club fortunes for the season in question.                 
 
The introduction of the three covariates (see column two in tables 3 to 5) predictably 
alters the baseline hazard estimates.  However, the October/November period remains the 
one containing the highest exit risk for the two earlier seasons and the estimated ceteris 
paribus effect for this particular period in the final season is rendered statistically 
insignificant.      
 
The most important covariate determining the hazard, in terms of both statistical 
significance and magnitude, is reserved for being in the relegation zone at the start of the 
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risk month.  The estimated effects for this covariate are positive and well determined in 
all three cases but, on the basis of asymptotic t-tests (not reported here), there is no 
evidence of a statistical change in this effect over the three seasons to which our analysis 
relates. The estimated effect for the attendance rate, the other time-varying covariate in 
the specification, is poorly determined in the 2002/3 season with an asymptotic t-value 
close to unity but comfortably achieves statistical significance at a conventional level in 
the specifications corresponding to the earliest and latest seasons.  There is again no 
evidence, on the basis of an asymptotic t-test, of a statistical difference in the effects of 
this covariate between the 2001/2 and the 2003/4 season.  The time-invariant covariate 
capturing whether the current manager was capped in his playing career registers an 
estimated effect that is just within the boundary of statistical significance at the 10% level 
using a two-tailed test for the last two seasons but does not register an independent effect 
in the earliest 2001/2 season.  The result for the later two seasons may be explained by a 
club managerial selection policy that erroneously infers the presence of managerial and 
coaching qualities from an individual’s playing career.  
 
The estimates reported in the third column of tables 3 to 5 are based on a pooled (or 
stacked) logit model specification where a constant replaces the baseline hazard.  The 
specifications in columns two and three are tested against each other using a conventional 
likelihood ratio test.  The null hypothesis comprises the model reported in the third 
column of these three tables.  The resultant tests with prob-values in parentheses are 
computed as 5.7 (0.12), 11.4 (0.01) and 4.8 (0.19) using the log-likelihood values 
reported in tables 3 to 5 respectively.  This suggests that the logistic model with the 
flexible baseline hazard is more congruent with the data than the model containing a 
constant term for only the 2002/3 season.  However, it is worth noting that the estimated 
effects for the covariates of interest appear insensitive to whether a constant term or a 
flexible baseline hazard is actually used in estimation.    
 
The estimates for the fixed effects model are reported in column four of tables 3 to 5.  
Given the nature of the estimator only time-varying covariates are permissible. The 
estimator only exploits information for those cases where the status changed – hence the 
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reduced sample sizes reported for this column in these tables.  Once the fixed effects are 
introduced, the model estimates suggest a role for attendance that is confined to the fixed 
effects specifications for the first two seasons.  However, the fact that a large volume of 
information is discarded in the construction of this estimator provides pause for some 
interpretational caution here.   
 
The estimates reported in the final column of tables 3 to 5 are based on a random effects 
logistic model with a constant term.  The estimated coefficients for σu and hence ρ are 
both negligible and poorly determined in a statistical sense in all cases.  This suggests no 
cross-period correlation and thus, implicitly, no evidence of random effects (or neglected 
heterogeneity) in the estimated regression models.  The estimated effects for the 
covariates are thus identical to those reported for the pooled logit specification containing 
a constant term (see column three of these tables).   It should be noted that replacing the 
constant term by the flexible baseline hazard in this final specification does not alter the 
finding in regard to neglected heterogeneity for any of the three seasons. 
   
The role of a set of other variables on the hazard of exit is now briefly investigated.   All 
but one is time-varying in nature.  Given the absence of any evidence of random effects, 
our preferred model for this exercise is the pooled logit with the flexible baseline hazard.  
The variables of interest are introduced separately into this model to assess their 
statistical significance using either an asymptotic t-test or a likelihood ratio test, and then 
subject to a joint statistical test overall.  The results are reported in table 6.  There is no 
variation in the hazard rates across the division a league club plays.  The age of the 
manager at the start of the season, his length of managerial service at the club, the 
number of clubs he has managed prior to the current one, and whether or not he is 
English exert no independent influence on the hazard.  In addition, a good FA cup run is 
unlikely to provide respite to a manager under-performing in the league, though the 
evidence for the 2001/2 season could be construed as marginal.  And managers who once 
played for the club they currently manage are not subject to any degree of favouritism in 
regard to their employment status.  The null hypothesis of no joint effects for these 
variables overall is also upheld by the data for all three seasons.     
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Conclusions 
 
This paper used data drawn from the English League to model hazard rates for club 
managers in three separate seasons: 2001/2, 2002/3 and 2003/4.  Over one-third of 
managers involuntarily exited their employment status within these three seasons.  We 
used a suggestion by Allison (1982) and Jenkins (1995) to model the hazard on the basis 
of the spell at risk, rather than the individual, using a standard logistic model. We defined 
the spell of risk in terms of months of the football season.  We also examined the role of 
neglected heterogeneity exploiting both random and fixed effects logistic models in this 
setting. 
 
The raw data suggest that October was generally a high risk month for involuntary 
departures.  There was no evidence that controlling for neglected heterogeneity through 
random effects was important to understanding the determinants of involuntary exit.  Our 
preferred specification was a pooled logistic model with a flexible baseline hazard, 
though this was not found to dominate unambiguously in all three seasons. In using this 
model, we found that the hazard rates were affected by a small set of covariates with the 
most important a time-varying measure defined around success on the field of play.  In 
this regard, our findings resonate with those of Audas, Dobson and Goddard (op.cit.).  In 
particular, league position was the most important determinant of an individual 
manager’s exit.  A measure for home attendance designed to proxy for, inter alia, the 
financial well-being of the club also exerted a role over the three seasons reviewed here.  
It should come as little surprise to English Football League mangers that the key to 
survival is avoiding a lowly position in the league within which they ply their trade.  No 
independent role for managerial age, experience, length of service or ethnicity was 
detected.  The fact that a manager had a playing relationship with the club in the past also 
counted for little.  Those that run English League football clubs appear understandably to 
be characterised by a distinct lack of sentiment. 
                     
On a more general note, we believe that the discrete-time approach adopted in this study 
appears eminently suitable to modelling hazard rates in applications where fast-changing 
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performance indicators are potentially important determinants of managerial survival.  
This would generally be the case in most professional sports labour market applications. 
In addition, the use of random effects within the discrete-time framework to capture 
neglected heterogeneity provides an added dimension that is relatively easy to implement 
with available software (e.g., STATA).  However, we are not entirely convinced that the 
use of Chamberlain’s fixed effects estimator to model neglected heterogeneity was all 
that informative in our application given the amount of information the procedure 
discarded.  Finally, the arbitrary choice of a month to represent the spell at risk could also 
be relaxed by the interested investigator to allow for a much finer discrete unit based on 
weeks or even days at risk. The extent to which the foregoing enhances empirical analysis 
is likely to be application dependent. 
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Table 1: Kaplan Meier Hazard Rates by Month and League Season 
Season Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. 
2001/2 0.011 
(0.011) 
0.068 
(0.028) 
0.146 
(0.045) 
0.057 
(0.029) 
0.061 
(0.031) 
0.048 
(0.029) 
0.034 
(0.025) 
0.070 
(0.036) 
0.075 
(0.039) 
2002/3   0.000 
  
 0.011 
(0.011) 
 0.100 
(0.035) 
 0.025 
(0.017) 
  0.000 
  
 0.038 
(0.022) 
  0.000 
  
0.039 
(0.023) 
 0.055 
(0.028) 
2003/4  0.023 
(0.016) 
 0.071 
(0.030) 
 0.051 
(0.026) 
 0.067 
(0.031) 
 0.028 
(0.021) 
 0.029 
(0.021) 
 0.076 
(0.035) 
 0.098 
(0.042) 
 0.036 
(0.026) 
Notes to table 1: 
 
(a) For the 2001/2 season: managers at start = 89; involuntary exits = 40; spells at risk=626. 
(b) For the 2002/3 season: managers at start = 91; involuntary exits = 22; spells at risk=736. 
(c) For the 2003/4 season: managers at start = 87; involuntary exits = 34; spells at risk=646. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Relevant Covariates 
Variable 
Name 
Description of Covariates 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 
Relegation 
Zone 
=1 if the league position at the start of the 
month was 15th place or below; =0 
otherwise.  
0.32  0.34 
 
0.33 
Attendance Home attendance as a percentage of a 
club’s ground capacity over the previous 
month. 
62.5  62.6  
  
65.9  
International =1 if the current manager was capped at 
senior  international level as a player; =0 
otherwise 
0.36  0.28 0.24 
Notes to table 2: 
 
(a) The sample averages reported are based on the pooled sample of 626 for 2001/2 season, 736 for 2002/3 
season and 646 for 2003/4 season. 
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Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Hazard Rate for 2001/2 Season 
Variables Pooled Logit 
with Flexible 
Baseline 
Hazard 
Pooled Logit 
with Flexible 
Baseline 
Hazard and 
Covariates 
Pooled  
Logit with 
Constant and 
Covariates 
 
Fixed Effects  
Logit with 
Covariates 
Random 
Effects Logit 
with 
Constant and 
Covariates 
Constant ‡ ‡ -1.778* (0.521) ‡ 
  -1.778* 
(0.521) 
August/ 
September 
-3.190* 
(0.386) 
-2.366* 
(0.639) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
October/ 
November 
-2.140* 
(0.264) 
-1.292*   
(0.571) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
December/ 
January 
-2.850* 
(0.389) 
-1.922* 
(0.635) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
February to 
April 
-2.766* 
(0.326) 
-1.773* 
(0.602) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Relegation 
Zone 
†  0.790* (0.346) 
 0.784* 
(0.342) 
0.379 
(0.471) 
 0.784* 
(0.342) 
International †   -0.123 
  (0.379)   
-0.145    
(0.376) ‡ 
-0.145 
 (0.376) 
Attendance † -0.021*   (0.008) 
-0.021*   
(0.008) 
-0.050*   
(0.026) 
-0.021* 
 (0.008) 
σu † † † † 0.001 (1.010) 
  ρ † † † ‡  0.0000 (0.0003) 
Log(L) -145.74   -137.33   -140.20  -53.45 -140.20 
Sample Size 626 626 626 184 626 
Notes to table 3: 
 
(a) † denotes not used in estimation. (b) ‡ not applicable in estimation. (c) * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 
level or better. (d) Log(L) denotes the log-likelihood value.  (e) The log-likelihood value for the fixed effects logit 
model is not comparable to the other log-likelihood values.  
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Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Hazard Rate for 2002/3 Season 
Variables Pooled Logit 
with Flexible 
Baseline 
Hazard 
Pooled Logit 
with Flexible 
Baseline 
Hazard and 
Covariates 
Pooled  
Logit with 
Constant and 
Covariates 
 
Fixed Effects  
Logit with 
Covariates 
Random 
Effects Logit 
with 
Constant and 
Covariates 
Constant ‡ ‡ -3.981* (0.721) ‡ 
  -3.981* 
(0.724) 
August/ 
September 
-5.198* 
(1.003) 
-5.923* 
(1.248) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
October/ 
November 
-2.677* 
(0.312) 
-3.368*   
(0.762) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
December/ 
January 
-3.945* 
(0.583) 
-4.554* 
(0.917) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
February to 
April 
-3.439* 
(0.384) 
-4.032* 
(0.779) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Relegation 
Zone 
†  1.713* (0.500) 
 1.671* 
(0.495) 
0.751 
(0.671) 
 1.671* 
(0.495) 
International †  0.790* (0.477) 
 0.889* 
(0.470) ‡ 
0.889* 
(0.470) 
Attendance † -0.009    (0.009) 
-0.012    
(0.010) 
-0.075*   
(0.043) 
-0.012 
 (0.010) 
σu † † † † 0.001 (0.620) 
  ρ † † † ‡  0.0000 (0.0003) 
Log(L) -93.07    -83.95    -89.63  -30.57 -89.63 
Sample Size 736 736 736 294 736 
Notes to table 4: 
 
(a) See notes to table 3.   
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Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Hazard Rate for 2003/4 Season 
Variables Pooled Logit 
with Flexible 
Baseline 
Hazard 
Pooled Logit 
with Flexible 
Baseline 
Hazard and 
Covariates 
Pooled  
Logit with 
Constant and 
Covariates 
 
Fixed Effects  
Logit with 
Covariates 
Random 
Effects Logit 
with 
Constant and 
Covariates 
Constant ‡ ‡ -1.727* (0.610) ‡ 
  -1.727* 
(0.610) 
August/ 
September 
-3.020* 
(0.362) 
-1.952* 
(0.680) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
October/ 
November 
-2.780* 
(0.344) 
-1.606*   
(0.668) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
December/ 
January 
-3.512* 
(0.507) 
-2.139* 
(0.781) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
February to 
April 
-2.565* 
(0.288) 
-1.084 
(0.687) ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Relegation 
Zone 
†  1.247* (0.381) 
 1.206* 
(0.378) 
0.729 
(0.496) 
 1.206* 
(0.378) 
International †    0.737* 
  (0.424)   
0.712*   
(0.420) ‡ 
0.712* 
 (0.420) 
Attendance † -0.035*   (0.010) 
-0.033*   
(0.010) 
-0.037    
(0.029) 
-0.033* 
 (0.010) 
σu † † † † 0.001 (0.462) 
  ρ † † † ‡  0.0000 (0.0002) 
Log(L) -131.58   -116.41   -118.80  -46.44 -118.80 
Sample Size 646 646 646 167 646 
Notes to table 5: 
 
(a) See notes to table 3.   
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Table 6: The Set of Unimportant Covariates 
Variable Description Test 
Statistic 
2001/2 
Season 
2002/3 
Season 
2003/4 
Season 
Length of Service (in Months) up to the 
July prior to the season start.  
t-ratio  0.03 -0.38 -1.15 
Manager’s Age (in Years) at August prior 
to the season start. 
t-ratio  0.43 -1.16 -0.68 
Manager is English=1; 0 otherwise. t-ratio  0.35   0.33  0.06 
Manager was a player at the current 
club=1; 0 otherwise. 
t-ratio -0.08   0.13 -0.02 
Number of clubs managed prior to the 
current club. 
t-ratio -0.70 -0.77 -1.09 
FA Cup Run† t-ratio -1.64  0.94 -1.08 
League Division Dummies.     6.06 (0.11) 
 1.77 
(0.62) 
 5.65 
(0.13) 
Joint Significance of all the above 
Variables 
   11.72 (0.23) 
 3.91 
(0.92) 
 9.32 
(0.41) 
Notes to table 6: 
 
(a) The t-ratios are asymptotic and the relevant critical value at the 0.05 level is ±1.96. 
(b)  † denotes time-varying covariates.   
(c) The FA cup run variable is an ordinal variable that captures the highest round achieved at the start of the risk month. 
(d)  The pooled (or stacked) logit refers to the specification with the flexible baseline hazard reported in column two of 
tables 3, 4 and 5. 
(e)  For the chi-squared values the numbers in parentheses refer to the significance level of the test. 
 
